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Impunity in Syria & Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: Is a revival of 
the ‘global enforcer’ approach in order? 
Alreem Kamal* 
Abstract As the Syrian conflict enters its tenth year, the chief perpetrators of atrocity crimes 
therein continue to enjoy virtually complete impunity. With no recourse to conventional international 
criminal justice mechanisms, universal jurisdiction in Europe, home to a large Syrian refugee 
population, is now in the spotlight. The conditions for its application, however, present clear obstacles 
to bringing within its scope Syrian regime actors not present in the forum. This article argues that the 
infamous ‘global enforcer’ approach to universal crimes demands reinstatement given the current state 
of affairs. Upon assessing the legislative universal jurisdiction models of a number of European states, 
it proceeds to discuss the legal basis and merits of adopting a progressive approach. The discussion 
also explores the shifts in the international legal landscape and the challenges in curbing the principle’s 
abuse. This article concludes that the ‘no safe haven’ model is effectively futile to the endeavour of 
holding Syrian government figures accountable. A model incorporating elements of a ‘global enforcer’ 
approach, conversely, appears the only viable way such individuals may be brought to justice.  
1. Introduction 
The war in Syria has raged for a decade. The era-defining mass atrocities committed in the 
country since 2011 have killed more than half a million civilians, displaced over twelve million, and 
destroyed entire civilian infrastructures.1 Peaceful protests against the regime of President Bashar Al-
Assad were swiftly and harrowingly met with bullets2 and eventually bombs. Armed opposition groups 
and other militias formed in response and continued to proliferate, and the so-called Islamic State seized 
an opportunity to surface. International actors throughout the course of the conflict have participated 
therein, leaving a trail of war crimes in their wake.3 While it is imperative to hold all parties to the 
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1 See Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, ‘Syria: 560,000 killed in seven years of war’ (2018) 
<https://www.syriahr.com/en/108829/>; Phillip Connor, ‘Most displaced Syrians are in the Middle East, and 
about a million are in Europe’ (Pew Research Center, 29 January 2018) <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/01/29/where-displaced-syrians-have-resettled/>; World Bank Group, ‘Syria Damage Assessment’ 
(2017) <http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/530541512657033401/pdf/121943-WP-P161647-
PUBLIC-Syria-Damage-Assessment.pdf>; 
2 Human Rights Watch, ‘Syria: Stop Shooting Protestors’ (2011) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/05/syria-
stop-shooting-protesters>  
3 See, e.g., Amnesty International, ‘Syria: US-led Coalition’s bombardment of Raqqa killed more than 1,600 
civilians’ (2019) <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/syria-us-led-coalitions-bombardment-raqqa-
killed-more-1600-civilians-new-findings>; Amnesty International, ‘Syria: Damning evidence of war crimes…by 
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conflict responsible for their commission of international crimes, this article is focused on seeking 
accountability for atrocities committed by individuals within the Syrian regime apparatus, the party 
overwhelmingly and disproportionately responsible for their perpetration. 4  The harm suffered by 
civilians at the hands of other parties is no less profound and their victims are deserving of justice all 
the same. 
Since 2011, the Syrian government has employed a military strategy calculated to inflict 
extraordinary harm on the civilian population as a punitive measure for protesting against the 50-year-
old dictatorship.5 This has entailed the orchestration of starvation-inducing sieges6, aerial bombardment 
campaigns targeting hospitals and schools7, and chemical weapons attacks8, forcing civilians to shelter 
in caves9 and medics to operate in underground hospitals.10 The regime also adheres to a perpetual 
policy of systematic torture of forcibly disappeared perceived dissidents held in its notorious detention 
centres, the conditions and practices of which amount to extermination as a crime against humanity.11 
The world continues to witness the seemingly perennial perpetration of almost every war crime and 
crime against humanity by the government and its allies, whom are conceivably emboldened by the 
failure of the international community to adequately respond to one of the worst humanitarian crises in 
modern history and the concomitant growth of a grievous culture of impunity. 
The sheer magnitude of the crisis and the reverberation of its attendant effects globally have 
naturally elicited strong calls for justice. Attached to the modern birth of international criminal law 
(ICL) was its foundational promise that acts of this kind would not go unpunished. The pathways to its 
traditional venues, however, are obstructed in this context. Syria’s domestic courts are wholly 
incompetent forums for the prosecution of the country’s war criminals12 and the establishment of an 
international criminal tribunal is effectively precluded by virtue of unfaltering vetoes at the United 
Nations (UN) Security Council by Russia and China. This has also eliminated the possibility of a 
 
4 Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), ‘… Parties…in Syria and the Death Toll Percentage Distribution…’ 
(2016) <http://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/six_main_Actors_that_kill_civilians_in_Syria_2016_en.pdf>  
5 Hafez Al-Assad, the incumbent president’s father, seized power in 1970. 
6 Tania Ocampos, ‘Starvation-inducing sieges: A tactic of war in Syria’ (MEE, 23 July 2016) 
<https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/starvation-inducing-sieges-tactic-war-syria>  
7 Syria war: Strikes on Idlib ‘target schools and hospitals’’ (BBC, 25 February 2020) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51638381> 
8 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (CoI Syria) 
(September 2017) UN Doc A/HRC/36/55 [67]. 
9  Priyanka Gupta, ‘Syrians fleeing attacks in Idlib find shelter in caves’ (Al Jazeera, 25 February 2020) 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/syrians-fleeing-attacks-idlib-find-shelter-caves-
200225093444302.html>. 
10  Osama Javaid, ‘Syria: Secret underground hospital established…’ (Al Jazeera, 25 November 2017) 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/syria-secret-underground-hospital-established-treat-injuries-
171125123450897.html>. 
11 CoI Syria, ‘Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in [Syria]’ (2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/CRP.1. 
12 Shelby Black, ‘Universal Jurisdiction and Syria: A Treaty Based Expansion of Universal Jurisdiction as a 
Solution to Impunity’ (2018) 21 International Trade & Business Law Review 177. 
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referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC)13 whose founding statute Syria is not party to. Faced 
with this state of affairs, and to tackle the impunity which ‘festers in gaps left by the international 
criminal justice system’14, the focus has turned to the principle of universal jurisdiction, which has 
emerged in this respect as a powerful weapon against impunity. Once deemed ‘in its death throes’15, 
the principle has garnered considerable momentum in recent years, with European courts prominently 
emerging as ‘fertile grounds for justice’16 in the Syrian context. The influx of hundreds of thousands of 
Syrian refugees into the continent has provided the impetus for the initiation of proceedings, to which 
the testimonies of the diasporic community have been crucial.17 
A myriad of factors, however, prompted the restriction of the principle’s scope in recent 
decades. The former champions of a liberal approach, Belgium and Spain, applied it in an infamously 
contentious manner, triggering intense political backlash which forced both states to considerably 
narrow the doctrine’s reach. The failure of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Arrest Warrant 
case18  to pronounce on the admissibility of universal jurisdiction further solidified the principle’s 
waning favourability. The extent to which universal jurisdiction in Europe is of utility to combating 
impunity in Syria is therefore questionable. 
Rather than frame the evolution of universal jurisdiction within a ‘rise and fall’ narrative, 
Langer observes that its trajectory has been that of a competition between two conceptions of the role 
states should play in the principle’s regime: the ‘no safe haven’ approach, which denotes that a state 
should not be a refuge for international criminals, and the ‘global enforcer’ paradigm, according to 
which states should assume an active role in punishing the latter group regardless of where they are in 
the world.19 
Certain European states’ universal jurisdiction models seem to embody a ‘no safe haven’ 
conception, requiring, inter alia, the presence or habitual residence of the alleged offender to initiate 
investigations. These approaches typically require other nexuses to be satisfied which are of dubious 
doctrinal compatibility, such as a link to the interests of the state and the nationality of the victim or 
perpetrator. Although the ‘no safe haven’ approach has its political merits, its stringent prerequisites 
render it virtually defunct in relation to the Syrian conflict. The ‘global enforcer’ approach thus warrants 
serious reconsideration. 
Whereas the ‘no safe haven’ approach has allowed for coincidental, episodic investigations and 
 
13 UNSC Draft resolution (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/2014/348. 
14 Black (n 12) 177. 
15 Antonio Cassese, ‘Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction’ 
(2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 589. 
16 Beth Van Schaack, Imagining Justice for Syria (Oxford University Press 2020) 266. 
17 Ibid 272. 
18 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v. Belgium) Judgement of 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports 2002. 
19 Máximo Langer, ‘Universal Jurisdiction Is Not Disappearing’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 245, 246. 
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prosecutions of low-ranking Syrian war criminals that fail to accurately reflect the scale of the 
international crimes committed and the perpetrators thereof20, states with progressive models which do 
not precondition the initiation of investigations on the presence or residence of the offender have been 
able to pursue offenders in a strategic fashion. This has resulted in the investigation of senior regime 
personnel both in and out of the forum.21 
This article argues that, to effectively utilize the ever-evolving principle with respect to the 
Syrian conflict, an approach to universal jurisdiction which integrates elements of a ‘global enforcer’ 
approach, enabling the investigation of regime actors without their presence in the forum, is not only 
better equipped to take on the incumbent challenge of bringing to justice this century’s most heinous 
transgressors, but also the only realistic way of ensuring denting the impunity which they have thus far 
enjoyed. This paradigm thus carries significant value that ought not be eclipsed by the taints of its 
controversial past. It also empowers states to fulfil their obligations by upholding the contemporary 
international legal order’s most sacred norms and safeguarding its interests.22  
Upon assessing the doctrine’s rationale and investigating the current conditions for its exercise 
in a number of states, this article examines the restrictive conditions with a view to demonstrating their 
futility to Syria. The discussion then explores the conventional and customary legal basis for the 
adoption of a progressive approach, highlighting its normative and practical advantages thereafter. The 
final chapter demonstrates the suitability of this approach by discussing developments in international 
law consistent with the expansion of the universal jurisdiction regime and ways in which the entrenched 
concerns that plague the principle may be assuaged. 
2. Universal jurisdiction & Europe: A primer 
2.1.  Canvassing the concept 
An inventive concept such as universal jurisdiction requires proper elucidation prior to any 
discussion of its application in practice. Despite there being ‘no generally accepted definition of 
universal jurisdiction in…international law’ 23 , it may nevertheless be defined as prescriptive 
jurisdiction24  over specific crimes irrespective of the place of commission, the nationality of the 
offender or the victim, or any other recognized ground of jurisdiction in international law. Although the 
 
20 Van Schaack (n 16) 271. 
21 Wolfgang Kaleck and Patrick Kroker, ‘Syrian Torture Investigations in Germany and Beyond…’ (2018) 16 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 165, 176. 
22 See Morten Bergsmo and Emiliano Buis (editors), Philosophical Foundations of International Criminal Law: 
Correlating Critical Thinkers (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2018). 
23 Arrest Warrant (n 18) Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert [44]. 
24  Roger O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’ (2004) 2 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 735, 745. 
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absence of a traditional link has been described as the feature ‘captur[ing] the essence of universal 
jurisdiction’ 25, a notion of greater profundity lies behind this ‘façade’.26 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions first breathing positive life into the concept 27 , universal 
jurisdiction is underpinned by the idea that certain crimes represent an attack on the legal norms that 
the international community in all its diversity has accepted as fundamental, hence vesting in every 
member an interest in and entitlement to prosecuting the alleged offenders. While some have asserted 
that universal jurisdiction may only be exercised over piracy under customary international law28, it is 
now widely accepted that genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture fall within the 
principle’s scope of application.29 
Amongst publicists, there is a ‘marked terminological inconsistency’30 regarding universal 
jurisdiction and a dizzying discrepancy as far as its apparent typology is concerned. Cassese, for 
instance, distinguishes between ‘absolute’ and ‘conditional’ universal jurisdiction, positing that only 
the latter’s exercise is contingent upon the presence of the suspect in the forum31, whereas Yee identifies 
categories of situations that either characterize or resemble universal jurisdiction. These  include ‘pure 
universal concern jurisdiction’ and ‘universal concern plus presence jurisdiction’. 32  As O’Keefe 
explicates, universal jurisdiction is a subset of jurisdiction to prescribe, hence the inaccuracy of 
speaking of a universal jurisdiction ‘in absentia’.33 The rule mandating the presence of a suspect as a 
precondition for initiating an investigation falls within the distinct ambit of enforcement jurisdiction.34 
If, at the time of the offence’s commission, no conventional link exists between the prescribing state 
and the offender, the exercise in question is universal jurisdiction ‘tout court’.35 For the purpose of this 
article, exercises in absentia refer to investigations into, and international arrest warrants against, 
suspects absent from the forum. 
 
25 Christian Tomuschat, Rapporteur of the IDI Commission on Universal Criminal Jurisdiction, quoted in IDI 
71(II) Annuaire de l’IDI. (2006), 257.  
26 Sienho Yee, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Concept, Logic, and Reality’ (2011) 10 Chinese Journal of International 
Law 503, 505. 
27 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field (First Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31, art 49; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second 
Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85, art 50; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 7S UNTS 135, art 129; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 
UNTS 287, art 146. 
28 Arrest Warrant (n 18) Separate Opinion of President Guillaume [12]. 
29 Robert Cryer, Håkan Friman, Darryl Robinson, and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International 
Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge University Press 2010). 
30 O’Keefe (n 24) 754. 
31 Antonio Cassese, ‘When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on 
the Congo v. Belgium Case’ (2002) 13(4) European Journal of International Law 853, 856.  
32 Yee (n 26) 508. 
33 O’Keefe (n 24) 750. 
34 Ibid 756. 
35 Ibid 755; (translation: without further addition or qualification; simply). 
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Another pivotal factor establishing the backdrop against which universal jurisdiction is 
legislated and applied today is its jurisprudential history, throughout which oscillating perceptions of 
the admissibility of certain exercises have been conveyed. Perhaps the first exercise of the principle in 
the post-1945 era was the Eichmann trial36 , which, despite drawing criticism for its enforcement 
methods37, was lauded as a triumph for the new accountability project.38 Similarly, Switzerland and 
Germany prosecuted several atrocity perpetrators in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia who later 
resided in the respective states.39 The paradigmatic example of universal jurisdiction’s exercise that is 
the Pinochet experience, however, adversely shaped perceptions of the principle among states, 
consequently occasioning an apprehension towards applying it for high-level offenders. 
Other notable investigations include those into Abdoulaye Yerodia, Ariel Sharon, and the Bush 
Six, which prompted the general curtailing of far-reaching universal jurisdiction legislation in Europe40, 
most strikingly in Belgium41 and Spain.42 Ingrained in the image that universal jurisdiction evokes, then, 
are these cautionary tales which serve to discourage its application over the masterminds of mass 
atrocities and cordon off the ‘global enforcer’ approach. It must be noted, however, that universal 
jurisdiction has nevertheless been ‘persistently, if quietly, expanding’, numerically and 
geographically. 43  The individuals tried have primarily been resident low-level offenders, which 
indicates a decline of the ‘global enforcer’ model rather than universality altogether.44 
Finally, it is important to note that, although the rationale of universal jurisdiction is 
inextricably linked to the concept of jus cogens norms, states are not obliged to exercise it in response 
to violations thereof.45 Even so, notwithstanding contentions of its inadvisability, the ‘right to punish 
war crimes…is possessed by any independent state whatsoever’.46 The vitality of universal jurisdiction 
to the enforcement and protection of peremptory norms is readily discernible. 
2.2.  Legislation & case law  
 
36 See Itamar Mann, ‘The Dual Foundation of Universal Jurisdiction: Towards a Jurisprudence for the ‘Court of 
Critique’’ (2010) 1(4) Transnational Legal Theory 485. 
37 See Kenneth Randall, ‘Universal Jurisdiction under International Law’ (1988) 66 Texas Law Review 785, 812. 
38 See, e.g., William Schabas, ‘The Contribution of the Eichmann Trial to International Law’ (2013) 26(3) Leiden 
Journal of International Law 667. 
39 Cryer et al. (n 29) 55. 
40 See Wolfgang Kaleck, ‘From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 1998-2008’ (2009) 30 
Michigan Journal of International Law 927. 
41 See Roozbeh Baker, ‘Universal Jurisdiction and the Case of Belgium: A Critical Assessment’ (2009) 16 ILSA 
Journal of International & Comparative Law 141.  
42 See Claudia Jiménez, ‘Combating impunity for international crimes in Spain: from the prosecution of Pinochet 
to the indictment of Garzón’ (2011) Institut Català Internacional per la Pau. 
43 Máximo Langer and Mackenzie Eason, ‘The Quiet Expansion of Universal Jurisdiction’ (2019) 30(3) European 
Journal of International Law 779, 781. 
44 Langer (n 19). 
45 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (DRC v. Uganda) ICJ Reports 2006 
[64]. 
46 UN War Crimes Commission, 15 War Crimes Reports 26 (1949). 
102 
 
© 2021 The Authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. 
Across several European states, universal jurisdiction has been utilized to bring Syrian war 
criminals to account, albeit primarily non-state actors present in the forum. However, some efforts to 
investigate Syrian regime members have been made. Among the eight jurisdictions within which such 
investigations are taking place, each adheres to a distinct understanding of the doctrine, mandating the 
fulfilment of certain conditions for its operation. To capture the span of the principle’s exercise in the 
continent and the extent to which government actors have been implicated, this section reviews the 
conditions imposed by European states exercising universal jurisdiction in the Syrian context and their 
nascent case law. 
In Germany, a suspect need not be present for the initiation of an investigation into or the 
issuance of an arrest warrant against him or her.47  The state is currently conducting a structural 
investigation into the Syrian regime48 which has produced the most significant cases to emerge from 
the war; the German Federal Court of Justice has issued an international arrest warrant against the 
former head of the Syrian Airforce Intelligence Directorate, Jamil Hassan49, and Syrian torture victims 
have witnessed former officials in Syria’s security apparatus on trial for crimes against humanity.50 
Throughout the course of the conflict, Germany has prosecuted several non-state actors residing in the 
forum.51 
France, which is jointly conducting a structural investigation with Germany52, requires the 
habitual residence of the suspect in the forum for the principle to apply. 53  France’s structural 
investigation is therefore based on the residence, as opposed to mere presence, of the suspect on French 
territory, and accordingly seeks to try only this category of culpable individuals. A former intelligence 
officer was arrested as a result.54 French judiciary have also issued international arrest warrants against 
Jamil Hassan and other senior government figures, ostensibly, however, on the basis of passive 
personality.55 
Another state conducting a structural investigation into the conflict is Sweden, whose laws 
deem neither the presence nor residence of a suspect necessary for the establishment of jurisdiction.56 
At the time of writing, Sweden is investigating a criminal complaint filed by torture survivors against 
multiple senior regime officials.57 
 
47 Völkerstrafgesetzbuch (June 26, 2002), s153f. 
48 Kaleck & Kroker (n 21) 178. 
49  Trial International, ‘Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review’ (2020) <https://trialinternational.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/TRIAL-International_UJAR-2020_DIGITAL.pdf>, 47. 
50  ECCHR, ‘First criminal trial worldwide on torture in Syria before a German court’ (2020) 
<https://www.ecchr.eu/en/case/first-criminal-trial-worldwide-on-torture-in-syria-before-a-german-court/>  
51 See, e.g., Trial International (n 49) 50. 
52 Ibid 29. 
53 French Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 689-11. 
54 Trial International (n 49) 29. 
55 Ibid 30. 
56 Swedish Criminal Code, Chapter 2, s3(6). 
57 Trial International (n 49) 73. 
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Norway allows for universal jurisdiction’s exercise over alleged perpetrators who are either 
domiciled in Norway for no less than a year or another Nordic country, and are present in Norway, if 
only temporarily.58 If neither of these conditions are satisfied, the suspect may be investigated if the 
victim is either domiciled in Norway or is a Norwegian national.59 The state is currently investigating 
a complaint against Syrian regime personnel filed by torture survivors.60 
In Switzerland, where attempts have been made to hold Syrian war criminals to account, 
investigations based on universality can be launched into putative perpetrators only upon their presence 
or entry into the forum.61 While Swiss courts have interpreted this condition liberally62, prosecutors 
possess discretionary powers to terminate an investigation if the suspect has left the forum and is not 
expected to return.63 A Swiss-based organization, at the behest of resident victims, has sought the 
prosecution of Rifaat Al-Assad, but prosecutors have dismissed witness testimonies as they were given 
when the suspect was no longer present in Switzerland.64 
The issue of a presence condition characterized by a perplexity as regards the jurisdictional 
time frame also appears in the Netherlands, which can exercise universal jurisdiction when the suspect 
is on Dutch soil.65 Upon his or her departure from the forum, however, Dutch jurisdiction ends.66 The 
principle may otherwise be exercised if either the victim or the suspect is a Dutch national.67 The 
Netherlands has thus far prosecuted members of non-state armed groups.68 
After undergoing considerable modification in a series of amendments, Spain’s legislation 
authorizes the principle’s application if either the victims are Spanish nationals, the alleged perpetrator 
is present in Spain, or there is any other relevant link to Spain.69 Treaty obligations may also invoke the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction.70 Upon the release of the ‘Caesar’ files, a Spanish citizen of Syrian 
origin was able to identify her missing brother among the sea of photos of mutilated bodies and 
consequently sought proceedings against high-ranking figures within the Syrian government.71 The 
case went through a number of national courts before it was finally dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.72 
 
58 Norwegian Penal Code (amended 29 March 2020), section 5. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Trial International (n 49) 66. 
61 Swiss Criminal Code, arts 6(1), 7(1-2). 
62 Federal Criminal Court (14 November 2018) TPF BB.2018.167, [2.3].  
63 Criminal Code (n 61) 264m(2). 
64 Trial International (n 49) 76. 
65 International Crimes Act (2003) (ICA), art 2. 
66  Open Society Justice Initiative, ‘Universal Jurisdiction Law and Practice in the Netherlands’ (2019) 
<https://trialinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Universal-Jurisdiction-Law-and-Practice-in-The-
Netherlands.pdf>, 11. 
67 ICA, art 2(1). 
68 See Van Schaack (n 16) 292-294. 
69 Organic Law 6/1985, July 1, on the Judiciary (amended 2014) art 23(4). 
70 Ibid art 23(2)(a). 
71 See Preliminary Proceedings Summary Procedure 0000011/2017, Central Court of Instruction No. 006 (27 
March 2017).  
72 Trial International (n 49) 70. 
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Similar proceedings have been instituted in Austria, where the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
is contingent upon either the perpetrator or victim being an Austrian citizen, the perpetrator being 
present in Austria or having habitual residence, or the infringement of Austrian national interests by the 
act in question.73 The state has prosecuted at least one opposition fighter74 and is currently investigating 
a complaint against multiple Syrian intelligence officials on behalf of torture survivors, among whom 
is an Austrian citizen.75 
3. The Conditions for universal jurisdiction’s exercise: Relevance to Syria & congruence 
with the rationale 
As the preceding section reveals, each of the European jurisdictions discussed mandate varying 
preconditions for the activation of universal jurisdiction. From the habitual residence requirement to 
the nationality of victim complainants, these specifications pose clear obstacles to the prosecution of 
international criminals residing in Syria. This chapter assesses these conditions with a view to 
determining their relevance to the conflict and the extent to which they comport with universal 
jurisdiction’s raison d’être.  
3.1.  The presence requirement 
One of the most debated issues in the discourse concerning the scope of universal jurisdiction 
is the condition stipulating the presence of a suspect in the territory of the state applying the principle. 
As such, it cannot be categorically stated that any consensus on the matter has formed. To Judge 
Ranjeva, a connection ratione loci must exist as a precondition for universal jurisdiction’s exercise.76 
Similarly, Judge Rezek contends that ‘[a]ctivism which would lead a State to seek outside its 
territory…a person…accused of [international] crimes…is in no way authorized by international 
law…’.77 Many states seemingly took heed of this, as evidenced by their conservative post-Arrest 
Warrant universal jurisdiction laws, which coincided with the Rome Statute’s entry into force. Another 
conceivable reason for this approach is the range of treaties imposing a presence condition under the 
distinct aut prosequi aut dedere principle.78 Similarly, courts have interpreted the Geneva Conventions’ 
penal sanctions provisions as obliging High Contracting Parties to simply deny harbour to war criminals 
 
73 Austrian Penal Code, s64.  
74 Trial International (n 49) 21. 
75 Ibid 22. 
76 Arrest Warrant (n 18) Declaration of Judge Ranjeva [6]. 
77 Ibid, Separate Opinion of Judge Rezek [6]. 
78 Cassese (n 15) 593. 
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in order to justify legislation interdicting the principle’s enforcement in absentia.79 But ‘[i]s it a true 
example of universality, if the obligation to search is restricted to the own territory?’80 
At this stage, it should be noted that no prohibitive rule in international law to the effect of 
proscribing the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia exists.81 The decision to adopt this model 
is based on the idea that a liberal one ‘may be politically inconvenient…because it is not conducive to 
international relations’.82 Be that as it may, the circumscribed ‘no safe haven’ model’s contributions to 
international justice are, by definition, limited by virtue of the presence requirement. While the 
paradigm was of relevance in the twentieth century with respect to the prosecution of Nazis83 and former 
Yugoslavs84, it cannot be anticipated to wield the same force in relation to non-European war criminals. 
One must question the utility to Syrian torture survivors of states’ insistence on the presence of 
their tormentors for investigations to be launched. It is hardly imaginable that, neither during the conflict 
nor after it, they would set foot in Europe for a sufficient time duration to enable a thorough 
investigation, still less one leading to charges and arrests. What is even less probable is the prospect of 
the perpetrators in question establishing a ‘habitual’ residence, which is defined as ‘physical presence 
qualified by some degree of stability…and…evidenced intention to create a stable life in the country’.85 
The category of persons satisfying this criterion may include opposition fighters and perhaps low-
ranking Syrian army soldiers, as has been predominantly the case. The individuals whose policies the 
latter group were executing, however, remain unperturbed and beyond the reach of justice. 
The deficiencies of the restrictive approach are particularly pronounced in the Swiss case 
against Rifaat Al-Assad, the uncle of Syria’s incumbent president. His presence in Switzerland in late 
2013 triggered the lodging of a criminal complaint against him with the Attorney General’s office.86 In 
2018, the federal prosecutor dismissed parts of victims’ testimonies regarding the Tadmor prison 
massacre in the 1980s, citing the lack of the suspect’s presence on Swiss territory at the time the 
complaint was filed. 87  Despite confirming the decision, the Federal Criminal Court held that 
investigations can commence even where the alleged perpetrator is merely anticipated to enter Swiss 
territory in the near future.88 In another case, the court confirmed the retention of Swiss jurisdiction in 
 
79 Spanish Supreme Court, Criminal Division, Judgement no. 797/2016. 
80 Arrest Warrant (n 18) Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal [31] (emphasis 
added). 
81 See Chapter IV (A) (1). 
82 Judge Van den Wyngaert (n 23) at [56]. 
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the face of a suspect’s departure from the forum.89 The case has nevertheless been at a standstill. 
Enveloping this presence requirement, then, is an air of disagreement as to its operation, leading to 
serious contradictory applications in practice. 
A state which equally lays bare the shortcomings of the ‘no safe haven’ approach is the 
Netherlands, particularly in relation to its jurisdictional time frame. Whereas the Swiss judiciary and 
prosecutors differ on whether jurisdiction remains operative in light of a suspect’s departure, Dutch law 
makes explicit that investigations into suspects may only endure so long as they are present in the forum. 
Should they depart, the investigation must cease accordingly.90 Again, one must query whether this 
modus operandi allows for testimonies to be given or investigations to be effectively conducted, if at 
all. Suppose the accused lands on Dutch soil numerous times throughout the year, yet keeps each visit 
short, thereby hampering investigative efforts. It is unclear whether, upon the re-entry of the suspect, 
Dutch authorities are competent to resume the investigation. In any case, the Netherlands would in 
effect be barred from carrying out efficient investigations on account of the impracticality of the pursuit. 
Paradoxically, this approach grants war criminals a ‘safe retreat’. 
The impediments of the presence requirement to reining in regime actors are stark. Although 
one can appreciate the political merits of its design of enabling the prosecution of ‘low-cost 
defendants’91 , it renders universal jurisdiction, as a venue for holding accountable Syrian regime 
offenders, all but futile. A ‘blow to universality’92 indeed, ‘strait-jacketed’ universal jurisdiction models 
such as these will arguably remain largely dormant in this respect. 
3.2.  Additional nexuses: Dissonant or reconcilable?  
Constituting the very logic of universal jurisdiction is the notion that, due to the odious 
character of the crimes concerned, traditional links to the perpetrator or victim are redundant.93 Also 
embedded in the rationale is the idea that the international community as a whole is affected by the 
commission of these crimes. It is curious, then, that certain states have conflictingly required related 
nexuses to be satisfied in this respect. 
When a state requires the victim of an atrocity crime to be a national in order to activate its 
jurisdiction, the exercise in question is that of the passive personality head of jurisdiction, rather than 
universal jurisdiction. The requirement that the alleged offender be a national of the state asserting 
jurisdiction equally subverts the logic of universality. Assuming the Geneva Conventions play a role in 
illuminating the characteristics of the doctrine, it must be highlighted that all four explicitly provide for 
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the prosecution of grave breaches regardless of the alleged offenders’ nationalities.94 These discordant 
conditions thus ‘distort the institution of universal jurisdiction in terms of both its content and object’.95 
Not only do they practically impede the application of universal jurisdiction, but they also convey a 
sense of aversion towards the regime. It stands to reason that to insist on them undermines both the idea 
embodied in the concept and the significance of its conception in international law. 
Equally bewildering is the alternative requirement of a ‘relevant’ link to the state. Atrocity 
crimes are of a universal character, ergo their perpetration is a matter of universal concern, thus 
establishing a ‘link’ to every state in the world. The execution of these crimes, by virtue of their 
peremptory character, constitute violations of obligations erga omnes, thereby endowing all states with 
an interest in responding to their commission.96 Indeed, in these situations, states ‘merely have, one and 
all, a common interest’.97 
In addition to affirming the universal character of the defendant’s crimes, Israel’s Supreme 
Court in the Eichmann trial partially grounded the justification of universality in the idea that ‘they are 
crimes whose…effects were so widespread as to shake the stability of the international community to 
its very foundations’.98 Alongside the birth of the contemporary international order, which is arguably 
sustained by the universal acknowledgement of the egregious nature of jus cogens crimes and respect 
for the prohibitions thereof, was the consensus that attacks thereon represent threats to international 
peace and security, a fundamental objective of the rules-based system that had risen from the ashes of 
the second world war. Every member of the international community, therefore, has an interest in 
upholding and defending these norms. 
Moreover, jurisdiction which necessitates the infringement of national interests for its 
activation relates to the protective principle. This principle entitles a state, to safeguard its interests, to 
prosecute foreigners who commit crimes abroad.  Following the preceding logic, however, international 
interests correspond to that of states. This nexus is then conspicuously antithetical to the understanding 
of universal jurisdiction as a transcendent jurisdictional head which is both denoting and affirmative of 
an ‘international community’ with ‘universal interests’.99 
These additional nexuses arguably betray an apathy on the part of European states towards the 
commission of atrocity crimes elsewhere. While the ostensible purpose of their imposition is to curb 
unbridled investigations into politically prominent individuals around the globe, it nevertheless forges 
a degree of dissonance between the principle’s theoretical and practical dimensions, thereby hindering 
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the growth of universality. 
4. Paving a path to justice: Revisiting the ‘global enforcer’ approach 
As the last chapter demonstrates, pursuing a narrow approach to universal jurisdiction which 
proscribes the investigation of those who have unrelentingly defied the rules of civilization in a manner 
reminiscent of the rampant barbarities of eras past, bears little fruit, if any. An obvious impediment to 
enforcing accountability, the ‘no safe haven’ method’s value to Syria is to be impugned. The ‘global 
enforcer’ approach must consequently be revisited. 
Preliminarily, it is relevant to note that the ‘global enforcer’ approach and its dichotomous 
counterpart define ends of a spectrum.100 In essence, the determination of whether a state’s model 
conforms to either approach requires an assessment of not only statutes and judicial decisions but also 
the ‘perceptions and contextual understanding’ of the system’s participants.101 For the purpose of this 
discussion, this model will be characterized by its ceding of the presence condition.102 Admittedly, the 
‘global enforcer’ approach is not appropriate in any and every circumstance, as past instances have 
shown. In situations, however, where impunity prevails owing to a staggering inaccessibility to virtually 
all accountability mechanisms, the case should differ. The following chapter thus explores the legal 
basis for an application of universal jurisdiction which forfeits the presence requirement for the 
initiation of investigative proceedings. 
4.1 The justification for a liberal model 
4.1.1 The legality of universal jurisdiction’s enforcement in absentia 
Before considering the basis for embracing a progressive approach, regard must be given to the 
preliminary issue of its legality, particularly on account of the ICJ judges’ division in Arrest Warrant. 
To Judge Guillaume, universal jurisdiction’s exercise in absentia is ‘unknown to international 
conventional law’.103 This, however, ‘confuses what is mandatory with what is permissible’.104 Despite 
the opinion that the application of the Lotus principle105 is irrelevant in this respect106, it is discernibly 
germane to the discussion due to its invocation by Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Buergenthal107, and Van 
den Wyngaert.108 
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In accordance with the seminal case’s judgement, enforcing universal jurisdiction in absentia 
is permissible unless an international rule to the contrary exists. Conventional and customary 
international law reveal an absence thereof. 109  Importantly, states’ insistence on the presence 
requirement cannot in itself constitute evidence of opinio juris.110 There may be practical or political 
justifications for this ‘negative practice’111, and absent the acknowledgement that their abstention is due 
to the exercise’s perceived illegality, no rule of custom can be generated.112 
Universal jurisdiction’s philosophy is also pertinent to this assessment. As Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans, and Buergenthal explain, if the purpose of designating particular acts as international crimes 
is the authorization of expansive jurisdiction over the perpetrators thereof, ‘there is no rule of 
international law…which makes illegal co-operative overt acts designed to secure their presence’ within 
the forum.113  It follows that international arrest warrants that succeed investigations into atrocity 
perpetrators are in conformity with international law. The 2001 Princeton Principles on Universal 
Jurisdiction114  and the 2005 Resolution of the Institut de Droit international115 take this same view in 
relation to investigative measures, with the former regarding this type of exercise as permissible partly 
in the interests of avoiding ‘stifling the evolution of universal jurisdiction’.116 
Due to the variance in this regard, international law lacks a rule that prohibits the exercise of 
absolute universality. 
4.1.2 Custody & the offender: Post-WWII practice 
Traversing the historical application of the principle is of pertinence in this respect, as it sheds 
light on its early conceptualizations and attendant exercise, thereby providing an interpretive guide of 
sorts. This practice, occurring around the time of universal jurisdiction’s modern conception, evinces 
the adoption of a rather broad approach thereto. Two matters must be emphasized, however. First, the 
concept of universality at the time, with respect to atrocity crimes at least, was in its infancy. Secondly, 
this approach was advanced by WWII’s victors, and may be criticized on grounds of political 
opportunism. But as this practice is progressively espoused by some states today and is consonant with 
the objectives of the international criminal justice project, it merits consideration. 
Following the cessation of hostilities in Europe, the Allied Powers prosecuted several war 
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criminals in occupied Germany and elsewhere.117 In responding to the jurisdictional question, the 
respective judicial bodies premised their findings on the parallel notion. In both the Almelo and Zyklon 
B trials, the British military courts held that ‘under the general doctrine called Universality of 
Jurisdiction over War Crimes, every independent state has in International Law jurisdiction to 
punish…war criminals in its custody regardless of the nationality of the victim or the place where the 
offence was committed’.118 Similarly, in the Hadamar trial, a United States (US) military commission 
established the lawfulness of assuming jurisdiction on the basis of universality, ‘according to which 
every…State has…jurisdiction to punish…war criminals in its custody…where, for some reason, the 
criminal would otherwise go unpunished’.119 
Both readings uniformly suggest that war criminals may be ‘punished’ when the offender is in 
the asserting state’s custody. Yet it remains unclear, as El Zeidy notes, how such persons could be found 
in a state’s custody.120 Given the historical context, the formulation could be construed as referring to 
the capture of suspects on the territory of the detaining power or their surrender thereto.121 Nothing 
negates, however, an interpretation of securing an offender’s presence as materializing by way of 
extradition. Not only is the language ambiguous, but the reference to punishing offenders may serve to 
substantiate this understanding. ‘Punishment’ in the Allies’ tribunals’ findings is contingent upon 
having the suspect in custody, and hence may plausibly refer to the act of prosecution, or conviction as 
a result. The logical supposition, then, is that the presence of the suspect was a prerequisite for trials 
rather than investigations. 
Furthermore, the Hadamar judgement’s allusion to impunity is especially noteworthy. The 
military commission’s ruling on jurisdiction held that it is established where, inter alia, ‘the criminal 
would otherwise go unpunished’.122 This position thus recognizes universal jurisdiction as a last resort 
in circumstances where a climate of impunity would otherwise prevail.  It is also appreciative of the 
imperative of accountability and the utilization of this enforcement mechanism for its achievement. 
This approach was thus able to efficiently weaponize universal jurisdiction to combat impunity. 
The idea was arguably to enforce norms as a way of establishing order in the aftermath of catastrophic 
events. The approaches to universal jurisdiction today are largely predicated on later political 
experiences, which are of important consideration, but too far a departure from the understandings 
prevailing at the time of the principle’s contemporary genesis arguably creates a degree of amnesia as 
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regards its intended application. 
4.1.3    The system of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
In determining the appositeness of pursuing a liberal way forward, one must consult the 
instruments upon which much of the modern understandings have ostensibly been based. The 
materiality in referring to the Geneva Conventions for this purpose is also derived from their citation in 
the separate and dissenting opinions in Arrest Warrant in relation to their authorization of ‘absolute’ 
universal jurisdiction. 
It is reasonable to conclude the legality of exercising universal jurisdiction in absentia under 
the 1949 Conventions. As Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal demonstrated, a textual 
interpretation of the provisions lends no support to the view that arrest warrants may not be issued for 
foreign offenders.123 Further, Judge Van den Wyngaert propounded that a teleological interpretation of 
the Geneva Conventions diametrically conflicts with a reading of Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention as imposing a limitation on a state’s exercise of universal jurisdiction. 124  Since the 
Conventions ‘mandate, and a fortiori permit, the extension of national criminal jurisdiction over grave 
breaches on the basis of universality’125, the issuance of international arrest warrants is a lawful exercise 
thereof. The obligation to bring suspects before national courts thus presupposes their presence at the 
trial stage.126 
Beyond the established fact of mere permissibility, however, it must be asked whether the 
system of the Geneva Conventions envisages the adoption by the High Contracting Parties of a ‘global 
enforcer’ approach. An analysis of none other than the first of its provisions is essential in this respect. 
 
Common Article 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions dictates that ‘[t]he High Contracting 
Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances’.127 
Prominently placed at the beginning of each of the four Conventions,128 both its text and position ‘were 
clearly designed…to convey the notion that the [Conventions] were to be regarded as endowed with a 
special character’.129 In elucidating the provision, the 1958 Commentary of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) to the Fourth Geneva Convention promulgates the following: 
“in the event of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations, the other Contracting 
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Parties…may, and should, endeavour to bring it back to an attitude of respect for the 
Convention. The proper working of the system of protection provided by the 
Convention demands in fact that the Contracting Parties should not be content merely 
to apply its provisions themselves, but should do everything in their power to ensure 
that the humanitarian principles underlying the Conventions are applied 
universally”.130 
 
The Commentary expressly adopts a ‘state-compliance’ interpretation of the undertaking, 
according to which contracting parties are to take measures against other contracting parties for their 
failure to comply with the Conventions.131 This view is also rooted in the ut res magis valeat quam 
pereat principle.132 
The first element of significance to note is that Article 1 imposes a positive obligation on 
contracting parties by using the term ‘ensure’ followed by ‘respect’. Contemplating obligations erga 
omnes133, the provision apparently mandates the assumption of an active role by states in responding to 
breaches of the Convention. In so doing, it has invalidated the politically preferable idle position many 
states have opted to maintain in light of the rampant commission of war crimes by their fellow 
contracting party, Syria. 
 Averring that the compliance of these states themselves is insufficient, the Commentary tasks 
contracting parties with fostering respect for the treaty series precisely because the Conventions’ system 
of protection is incapable of effectuation without this incumbent role’s fulfilment. Given the historical 
context of the Conventions’ adoption, common Article 1 appreciates the consequences that not only a 
failure to abide by the Conventions’ principles would produce but also a lack of accountability therefor. 
When read in conjunction with the penal sanctions provisions134, one may conclude that relegating 
universal jurisdiction to the position of a subservient and therefore rarely utilized mechanism in the face 
of war crimes functions to inhibit bringing to fruition the protection system intended by the 1949 
Conventions. 
A further striking aspect of the Commentary’s formulation lies in its assertion that contracting 
states ‘should do everything in their power to ensure that the humanitarian principles underlying the 
Conventions are applied universally’.135 The language here, in addition to embracing the concept of 
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universality, has placed contracting parties in the position of guardians of the Conventions, vesting in 
them the power to enforce its principles globally. Considering that the Commentary refers to reactivity 
in the event of a party’s non-compliance, it may be reasoned that ‘ensuring’ the Conventions’ 
application vis-à-vis fellow contracting states can only take place after the fact of a breach. It follows 
that exercising universal jurisdiction is one such way ‘application’ can manifest. 
In view of the Geneva Conventions having garnered universal ratification, the elucidation 
advanced by the 1958 Commentary evidently embodies the very notion of a ‘global enforcer’ approach, 
in that it saddles states with the authority to, for example, punish war crimes wherever they are 
committed. It further asks that states do all that is within their power to ensure universal application, 
ostensibly as a key component to observing common Article 1. Although the meaning of ‘power’ here 
is shrouded in vagueness136 , it arguably suffices, for the purposes of this discussion, to recall that it is 
at least within a state’s legal power to expand its universal jurisdiction legislation so as to bring within 
its remit non-resident war criminals. 
It is thus difficult to reconcile the ‘no safe haven’ approach with common Article 1. This model 
is grounded in the idea that a state shall remain unconcerned with grave breaches of the Conventions 
committed by other contracting states, still less assume a role in punishing them, unless by way of 
nexuses that may only be satisfied in rare circumstances, in direct contrast to the letter and spirit of the 
provision. Regardless of protests against the idea of states becoming ‘global policemen’137, Article 1 is 
evidently ‘no mere empty form of words, but has been deliberately invested with imperative force’.138 
Lastly,  although the term ‘undertake’ in common Article 1 denotes an obligation, it has 
acquired a ‘recommendatory meaning’ in international practice139, which is reinforced by the terms 
‘may, and should’ in the ICRC commentary.140 This does not, however, detract from the fact that a 
‘highly effective system of repression was required and intended by the drafters’.141 Accordingly, 
responses by third states to breaches of the Conventions is an indispensable means to give effect to their 
‘lofty’ motive142 and attain their desired protection system.  
4.1.4   The repression of international crimes: Jus cogens & obligations erga omnes 
Central to the international legal order as it stands is the classification of inviolable, overriding 
norms that both define and protect the international community’s values. They proscribe acts deemed 
wholly incompatible with the vision of an order founded on the objectives of peace and security. The 
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implication emanating from characterizing a norm as jus cogens is the establishment of obligations erga 
omnes, or ‘flowing to all’. All states are accordingly vested with a legal interest in protecting this 
category of norms.143 
Among the acts belonging to this hierarchically superior normative category are crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and torture, all of which have been perpetrated by Syrian regime forces on an 
industrial scale.144 The international community of states, in consequence, has an especially exigent 
duty to respond to these infractions in view of the Security Council’s paralysis and the ICC’s lack of 
jurisdiction. Confusion surrounds, however, the exact legal implications of an obligation erga omnes.  
First acknowledged by the ICJ in the 1970 Barcelona Traction case145, it is clear that the 
concept does not merely generate a right of standing. In Bassiouni’s view, obligations erga omnes are 
‘those of a duty’ rather than discretionary rights.146 But for this understanding, ‘jus cogens would not 
constitute a peremptory norm of international law’.147 Significantly, the publicist emphatically posits 
that ‘[a]bove all, the characterization of certain crimes as jus cogens places upon states the obligatio 
erga omnes not to grant impunity to the violators of such crimes’.148 States are thus duty-bound to bring 
such offenders to justice. 
As previously discussed, requiring the presence of the suspect to initiate investigations presents 
discernible obstacles to the punishment of those who have contravened norms at the apex of the 
international legal system.  Both the duty to protect these norms and punish such transgressors are 
arguably incapable of being discharged due to the limitations of the ‘no safe haven’ approach. The 
obligation to repress core crimes and combat impunity entails the employment of all legal means, which 
evidently includes the enforcement of universal jurisdiction in absentia. With respect to securing an 
offender’s presence in the forum, Stern argues that ‘all legal devices’ should be deployed.149  A 
progressive approach to universal jurisdiction would therefore appear concordant with states’ 
obligations. A ‘no safe haven’ approach which implicitly fails to adequately address impunity in Syria, 
on the other hand, is tenuously defensible in this regard. 
Protecting non-derogable values by way of punishing perpetrators of atrocity crimes is arguably 
integral to maintaining and strengthening the international rule of law. The corollary to the rationale of 
universal jurisdiction is that each state is ‘a guardian of international law and an agent for its 
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enforcement’.150 Denying this responsibility would not only be a ‘travesty of law and a betrayal of the 
universal need for justice’ 151  but also a blow to universal jurisdiction’s constitutive function of 
imagining and ‘cultivating an international community’.152 
4.2 The merits of a progressive response to international crimes 
Having established the justification for the adoption of a liberal approach to universal 
jurisdiction, this section outlines the potential value of its application in practice to Syria and the wider 
accountability framework. 
The scale of suffering in Syria and the impunity which encircles its architects has triggered a 
wave of accountability-related legal creativity. The most remarkable manifestation of this innovation is 
Germany’s structural investigation technique, which combines both conceptions of the state's role with 
regard to international crimes and enables the pursuit of a strategic approach to hold to account those 
bearing the greatest responsibility for atrocity crimes.153 By ceding the presence requirement, German 
prosecutors have achieved nuance in the quest for accountability in Syria, investigating both those 
present and absent from the forum. This has also successfully demonstrated the approach’s ability to 
‘fill the gaps in (the incomplete and imperfect) system of [ICL]’.154 
As regards the advantages of this approach, consideration must first be given to those pertaining 
to investigations. First, as Kaleck and Kroker highlight, an open investigation enables authorities to 
react promptly upon the suspect’s entry into the forum.155  If investigations are dependent on the 
suspect’s entry, there is little that can be acted upon in the event of that development. Secondly, the 
evidence produced may assist and expedite future proceedings in national and international fora.156 In 
this sense, these investigations may complement the work of the UN’s International, Impartial and 
Independent Mechanism for Syria (IIIM).157 
A further significant set of benefits relate to international arrest warrants. The first of these 
concerns their norm stabilizing effect.158 In line with states’ obligations, they work to reaffirm and 
uphold peremptory norms. In this regard, it is important to recall Addis’ conception of universal 
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jurisdiction’s constitutive nature as a means by which communitarian values are identified and 
subsequently protected, in the aggregate creating a particular version of an ‘international 
community’.159 
In a similar vein, such measures communicate to violators of fundamental norms that 
consequences will inevitably ensue and that the impunity which they enjoy is by no means absolute. It 
signals the international community’s intolerance to the perpetration of core crimes160, and may, for 
fear of the prospect of prosecution, apply pressure on the individuals concerned to cease their criminal 
activities. There is evidence to suggest that Syrian government figures are seriously alarmed by the 
prosecution of their associates in Europe, indicating the palpable effect of efforts to combat impunity 
outside the country’s borders.161 
Lastly, international arrest warrants signify that the punishment of the offenders is already in 
motion in that it restricts their ability to travel freely162, thereby cornering them and partly encapsulating 
international law’s intended approach to and perception of hostis humani generis.163  
Capable of effectively puncturing the shield of impunity surrounding the Syrian government, 
an approach to universal jurisdiction which progressively incorporates elements of a ‘global enforcer’ 
model appears the sole way in which Syrian offenders may be brought to justice in the foreseeable 
future. A hybrid model which combines both the latter and the ‘no safe haven’ approach offers a 
‘modern and pragmatic approach’164 to universal jurisdiction in Europe. Germany’s model is a paragon 
in this respect, as evidenced by its issuance of an international arrest warrant against Jamil Hassan165, a 
Syrian resident, and the ongoing prosecution of Anwar Raslan166, a German resident, for his role within 
the state’s torture complex. A pure ‘no safe haven’ model, in contrast, tends to institutionalize de facto 
impunity.167 
5 Accepting an expansive approach today: Developments & reassurances 
5.1  International law: A changing landscape 
As the exercise of universal jurisdiction has at times been repudiated, the prospect of an 
expansive approach thereto being accepted may be questioned. The history of international law and the 
dynamics of international relations, however, have invariably involved change, leading to the reform of 
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the status quo and the once unimaginable to manifest. A number of matters must be taken into 
consideration in this respect. 
No international law institution was conceived in a vacuum. From the Peace of Westphalia to 
the Hague Conventions, the establishment of the Nuremberg tribunal to the ICC, it is dramatic events 
in the international sphere and their consequent propellant effects that trigger imaginative responses. 
The latter of the two developments represented a paradigm shift168 in the attitudes to the commission of 
atrocities. Although dating back to the Grotian epoch169, the concept of accountability required the 
construction of a modern system for its actualization; legal creativity was thus exercised to accomplish 
this. Under the present circumstances too, the employment of progressive legal means that are better 
equipped to challenge impunity is a compelling imperative. Considering the nature and magnitude of 
the crimes in Syria, a reformed liberal approach is far from radical. On the contrary, it is at such critical 
moments, when the very ability of the international justice project to achieve its purpose is impugned, 
that resourceful responses should be adopted. When one also considers the progressive prioritization of 
human rights vis-à-vis state sovereignty, the expansion of universal jurisdiction appears very much in 
line with the overall trajectory. 
The case of Syria may hence prove a catalyst for change, similar to that of Nazi Germany. In 
this respect, Jessberger describes Germany’s investigative technique as a ‘creative moment in law that 
is, in some ways, like the Nuremberg trials’.170 
Relatedly, a salient development has also emerged in practice. Pursuant to its momentous 
international arrest warrant against Jamil Hassan in June 2018, Germany formally requested the 
extradition of the military general from Lebanon in February 2019.171 Days later, the US government 
issued a statement in support of the request, thereby placing itself on the record as endorsing Germany’s 
model of universal jurisdiction.172 Where this practice was once condemned for ‘by-passing the rules 
of international relations’173, it has now received the support of a state previously averse to it.174 
These developments challenge Judge Guillaume’s contention that ‘absolute’ universal 
jurisdiction has never been desired at any point in ICL’s evolution.175 Resonating almost two decades 
later, conversely, is the prescient assertion that ‘[t]he passage of time changes perceptions'.176 Several 
 
168 See Michael Scharf, ‘Seizing the ‘Grotian Moment’: Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law 
in Times of Fundamental Change’ (2010) 43 Cornell International Law Journal 439. 
169 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (1925) 504. 
170 Cathrin Schaer, ‘Alleged Syrian war criminals face landmark trial in Germany’ (Al Jazeera, 23 April 2020) 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/alleged-syrian-war-criminals-face-trial-germany-
200421085132322.html>  
171  Michael Scharf, Milena Sterio, and Paul Williams, The Syrian Conflict's Impact on International Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2020) 107. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Chinese embassy’s spokesperson in Spain, 2009, quoted in Jiménez (n 42) 33. 
174 Scharf et al. (n 171) 107. 
175 President Guillaume (n 28) [15]. 
176 Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal (n 80) [39]. 
118 
 
© 2021 The Authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. 
states’ universal jurisdiction statutes, within and beyond the borders of Europe, at present encompass 
elements of a ‘global enforcer’ approach.177 As recent as 2014, the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
went so far as to oblige the state to enforce universal jurisdiction in absentia.178 This expansion is 
plausibly a product of the growing appetite for international justice in recent years.179 With Germany 
resurrecting an abandoned accountability model and paving the way for other states to follow suit, the 
possibility of a customary norm crystallizing in the future cannot be discounted. Indeed, Scharf et al. 
have argued that the Syrian conflict likely represents a ‘Grotian moment’180, highlighting its distinctive 
impact on international law. 
5.2 Criticisms & concerns 
As previously discussed, the exercise of universal jurisdiction is not without controversy. 
Against the complex historical backdrop, it is only natural to consider with caution the proposition of 
reviving a heavily criticized model.  The fledgling business of international criminal accountability, 
however, innately entails the elicitation of some degree of outcry. In a nascent order wherein the 
struggle to strike a balance between the equally vital considerations of peaceful international relations 
and retribution for atrocity perpetrators is ever extant, criticisms of accountability schemes are 
pervasive regardless of the international justice forum. 
One cannot overlook, however, the instances in which the principle was applied in a liberal 
fashion without subsequent condemnation (on its merits), such as Israel’s prosecution of Adolf 
Eichmann. Nazi atrocities, indeed, ‘shocked the conscience of nations’.181 It may therefore be reasoned 
that, on account of a consensus that was established as to the gravity of the crimes and the culpability 
therefor, the prosecution of the perpetrators was palatable.  Similarly today, states which have issued 
arrest warrants against Syrian regime officials 182  have successfully evaded the unfortunate 
repercussions faced by the former champions of the ‘global enforcer’ approach. 
Acknowledging the inevitability of provoking the state whose governmental figures are under 
investigation does not change the fact that exercising universal jurisdiction in an expansive manner 
renders it open to abuse. Anchors to moderate its application must therefore be in place to avoid the 
‘judicial chaos’183 that may ensue. 
First, a ‘global enforcer’ approach to state-perpetrated universal crimes should only come into 
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play when a) its judicial organs are corrupted and b) access to the ICC and international criminal 
tribunals established by the UN Security Council is blocked. This accords with customary international 
law, under which universal jurisdiction operates as a ‘default jurisdiction’.184 Consider, for example, a 
situation in which a state issues an international arrest warrant against war criminals residing in Libya 
as these individuals are concurrently on trial at the ICC. This condition is therefore essential to 
preserving order within the international criminal system. 
Secondly, procedural immunities must be duly observed.185 In Arrest Warrant, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo eventually conceded to the legality of Belgium’s exercise of universal 
jurisdiction in absentia186 and rightly disputed its disregard for the head of state immunity enjoyed by 
its foreign minister. Respecting immunities in the application of universal jurisdiction is therefore 
necessary not only for the avoidance of sound criticism but also to lend credibility to the endeavour. 
The pursuit of justice must ultimately conform to the rule of law. 
Lastly, investigations should only be initiated at the request of victims or their relatives.187 This 
would, inter alia, allay concerns of legal imperialism, principally by precluding politically motivated 
investigations. In Europe, it is the resolute pursuance of accountability by refugee communities188 that 
has reinvigorated the ‘global enforcer’ model. As Scharf et al. note, the problem of impunity was ‘quite 
literally delivered to the doorsteps of the European states by [Syrian] refugees’189, arguably rendering 
them suitable candidates to adopt an expansive approach to universality. 
6. Conclusion 
A year prior to the outbreak of the Syrian war, states affirmed that ‘one of the major 
achievements in international law in recent decades had been the shared understanding that there should 
be no impunity for serious crimes’.190 Over a decade later, the dissonance between rhetoric and reality 
could not be more pronounced than in the case of the Levantine state. 
With the unremitting carnage by the Syrian regime and the obstruction of the pathways to 
conventional ICL enforcement mechanisms, universal jurisdiction emerges as all but the last hope for 
Syrian victims to receive justice. 
Across Europe, however, minimal efforts to hold to account those disproportionately 
responsible for flagrant international law violations have been made. As this article has sought to 
demonstrate, the ‘no safe haven’ model to which many states in the continent subscribe is unduly 
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limited, and thus incapable of contributing to the endeavour at hand. Between requiring the presence of 
the offender to initiate investigations and masquerading other jurisdictional heads as universal 
jurisdiction, the approach virtually excludes the chief war criminals from its reach. 
To bring to justice the architects of violence, a progressive universal jurisdiction model which 
embraces characteristics of a ‘global enforcer’ paradigm, primarily by relinquishing the presence 
condition and other arbitrary nexuses, offers the only viable way of eroding the impunity shield 
surrounding the Syrian regime apparatus under the present circumstances. Given the unsustainable 
status quo, it is critical to reckon with the fatal flaws of circumscribed approaches through political 
courage. 
Despite a degree of support in international practice for the insistence on such requirements, 
their justifiability as a matter of policy is contentious. As this article has argued, a basis for the adoption 
of a liberal model, particularly in situations of pervasive impunity, exists, and its normative and practical 
benefits to the Syrian accountability project are tangible. Evidence of a transformation of accountability 
paradigms is perceptible as well, in addition to ways in which this approach may be regulated. 
Notwithstanding prior controversies regarding its application, the value of a strategically propitious 
approach to holding accountable Syrian government offenders demands the revival of an imaginative 
yet long-shunned model to be reconsidered. Ultimately, ‘the short history of international criminal 
justice, from Nuremberg to the present, is full of…improbable…ideas that have pushed the project 
forward’.191 
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